Kessler, Z. B. A Theory of Emergent Government Power and Constraint: An Application to Federal Budgeting.
Kessler, Zachary B. “A Theory of Emergent Government Power and Constraint: An Application to Federal Budgeting” (n.d.).
Kessler, Zachary B. A Theory of Emergent Government Power and Constraint: An Application to Federal Budgeting.
When considering the evolution of the state, the acknowledgement of self-interested politicians is now commonplace in political economy. However, this framework often implicitly assumes a congruence among politicians’ perception of the state’s capabilities, an incorrect assertion. To resolve this heterogeneity, politicians generate various parliamentary frameworks and internal rules to facilitate coordination. One such area this heterogeneity directly impacts is the growth of government spending. This paper has two main goals. First, describe the emergence of internal rules and competitive mechanisms. Second, using data from the United States White House on government outlays for the 20th century, this project develops an agent-based model to replicate the time series, demonstrating the only way to accurately recreate the spending path and agent behaviors of the U.S. government is to have heterogeneity in politicians’ gain and perception of the government’s capabilities.